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PRECAP; Krakauer v. State of Montana: Montana’s Constitutional
Right to Know v. FERPA
Elijah Inabnit
I. QUESTION PRESENTED
Does the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act preempt the
right to know provided in the Montana Constitution and prohibit
disclosure of the Commissioner of Higher Education’s records relating to
Jordan Johnson’s University disciplinary proceedings?
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In May 2012, a University of Montana student was found guilty
of rape by the University of Montana Dean of Students and expelled from
the University.1 The student appealed this determination to the VicePresident for Student Affairs and underwent a hearing before the
University Court, which subsequently affirmed the decision of the Dean
of Students.2 The University Court’s decision was then reviewed by the
President of the University of Montana, Royce Engstrom, who also
affirmed the decision of the Dean of Students.3 In June 2012, the student’s
attorney appealed the President’s decision to the Commissioner of Higher
Education, Clayton Christian (the Commissioner).4 The Commissioner’s
review was recorded in a written decision.5 However, nothing is publically
known about the results of the review or the determinations made by the
Commissioner.6
In June 2012, U.S. District Court Judge Dana Christensen
“unsealed a federal court file containing all of the records of the
disciplinary action through the President’s decision to affirm the expulsion
recommendation” of the student referred to above.7 In July 2012, the
Missoula County Attorney publically charged University of Montana
Student Jordan Johnson (Johnson) with sexual intercourse without
consent.8 The facts included in Johnson’s charging documents were
identical to the facts contained in the unsealed federal court file released

1

Appellee’s Response Brief, Krakauer v. State of Montana, 2015 WL 6599701 at *7–8 (Mont. 2015)
(No. DA 15-0502).
2
Id. at *8.
3
Id. at *9.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id. at *9–10.
7
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at *12.
8
Id. at *10.
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by Judge Christensen in June.9 All aspects of Johnson’s trial and
subsequent acquittal were thoroughly publicized by the media.10
While the results of the Commissioner’s review of the student’s
disciplinary proceedings are not publically known, Johnson “remained in
school and continued to participate as the Grizzly quarterback.”11 The
unknown reasoning and procedure behind the Commissioner’s apparent
reversal of the determinations made by the Dean of Students, the
University Court and the President are the driving force behind this
litigation.
In January 2014, Appellee Jon Krakauer (Krakauer) filed a request
with Appellant State of Montana, by and through the Commissioner, to
inspect or receive copies of the Commissioner’s records “that concern the
actions of the Office of the Commissioner of Higher Education . . .
regarding the ruling by the University Court . . . in which student Jordan
Johnson was found guilty of rape.”12 The Commissioner refused
Krakauer’s request asserting that the demands of the student’s privacy
“clearly outweighed the merits of public disclosure of the documents”
concerning the student’s disciplinary proceeding, that Krakauer, as a nonresident, did not have a right to inspect or obtain copies of public
documents in Montana and that both the Family Education Rights and
Privacy Act (FERPA) and Montana Code Annotated § 20–25–515
prohibited disclosure.13
Krakauer initiated the present litigation alleging his rights to
examine documents under the right to know enumerated in Article II,
Section 9 of the Montana Constitution was infringed by the Commissioner
and petitioning the Montana First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark
County, to order the Commissioner to produce the records.14 Both parties
moved for summary judgment and, after oral argument, the District Court
granted Krakauer’s motion and directed the Commissioner to provide
Krakauer with copies or access to the requested records with all students’
names, birth dates, social security numbers, addresses and telephone
numbers redacted.15 The Commissioner appeals this judgment.

9

Id.
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id. at *11; Appellant’s Opening Brief, Krakauer v. State of Montana, 2015 WL 6599701 at *6
(Mont. 2015) (No. DA 15-0502).
13
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 12, at *6–7; Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at
*11.
14
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 12, at *7; Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at *13.
15
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 12, at *7.
10
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III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Appellant Commissioner of Higher Education
1.
FERPA, As Amended, Prevents the Release of Any Records
Responsive to Krakauer’s Request.
The Commissioner asserts that “any education institution”
receiving federal aid is “contractually bound to comply with the
requirements of FERPA.”16 The Commissioner’s primary contention is
that FERPA prohibits him from releasing the disciplinary records unless
he has obtained consent from the students to which the records relate, an
exemption or exception applies, or the records do not contain personally
identifiable information.17 The Commissioner contends that FERPA
prohibits disclosure in this case because none of these criteria have been
met.
The Commissioner points out that the Montana Supreme Court
decision in Board of Trustees, Cut Bank Pub. Sch. v. Cut Bank Pioneer
Press,18 upon which the District Court relied, does not interpret FERPA as
amended and is therefore no longer legal precedent.19 In Pioneer Press,
the Court held that student disciplinary records could be released because
the redacted records did not contain “personally identifiable information”
and, therefore, would not violate FERPA.20 The definition of “personally
identifiable information” under FERPA has been amended since Pioneer
Press to include “information requested by a person who the education
agency or institution reasonably believes knows the identity of the student
to whom the education record relates.”21 Accordingly, the Commissioner
asserts that because Krakauer requested Johnson’s records by name, the
Commissioner is prohibited by FERPA from complying with the request.22
Further, the Commissioner argues that the District Court misinterpreted
Pioneer Press by summarizing the Court’s holding in Pioneer Press as
standing for the notion that anytime records are redacted their release does
not violate FERPA.23 The Commissioner asserts that the Court’s holding
in Pioneer Press was more nuanced, standing for the idea that “it was not
the redactions in and of themselves that prevented a FERPA violation, but
rather the ability of those redactions to conceal personally identifiable

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id. at *13.
Id. at *7, 14–15.
160 P.3d 482 (Mont. 2007).
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 12, at *14–15.
Id. at *14.
Id. at 14–15 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2008)).
Id. at *16.
Id.
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information.”24 The Commissioner contends that redaction in this case
cannot conceal the personally identifiable information because Krakauer
has requested the records relating to a named student.25
Additionally, the Commissioner argues that FERPA prohibits an
educational institution from “having a ‘policy or practice’ of releasing
educational records” without consent or the application of an exemption
or exception.26 The Commissioner argues that enforcing a court order to
produce student records amounts to a prohibited policy or practice under
FERPA because it “will create binding precedent” requiring the release of
student records whenever the “requestor knows the identity of the student”
involved.27 The Commissioner asserts that a court order of production
“necessarily set[s] some kind of precedent . . . and a policy or practice to
some extent would be established.”28 The Commissioner then contends
that the “judicial subpoena or order” exception does not apply because this
exception only “informs an educational institution when it may release
educational records” but does not inform a court as to “when it may enter
an order.”29 The Commissioner alleges that under FERPA, individual
privacy interests are great and need to be outweighed by a demonstration
of “genuine need” for the information by the requesting party, which is a
“significantly heavier burden” than exists with respect to the discovery of
other types of information.30 Under this standard, the Commissioner
claims that Krakauer’s request does not outweigh the privacy interests at
stake because Krakauer wants to use the information for economic gain.31
2.
Montana Code Annotated § 20–25–515 Prevents the Release of
Any Records Responsive to Krakauer’s Request.
The Commissioner’s next issue concerns whether or not Montana
Code Annotated § 20–25–515 prohibited the District Court from
compelling release of the requested records.32 Montana Code Annotated §
20–25–515 allows a university to “release a student’s academic record
only when requested by the student or by a subpoena issued by a court . .
. of competent jurisdiction.”33 The Commissioner points out that the

24

Id. (citing Pioneer Press, 160 P.3d at 487–88).
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 12, at *16.
26
Id. at *18 (quoting 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g (2015)).
27
Id. at *19–20.
28
Id. at *19 (quoting Press-Citizen Co. v. Univ. of Iowa, 817 N.W.2d 480, 488 (Iowa 2012)).
29
Id. at *20 (quoting Press-Citizen Co., 817 N.W.2d at 492–93).
30
Id. at *21–22 (quoting Moeck v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142431 at *6–
8 (M.D. Pa. 2014)).
31
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 12, at *22–23.
32
Id. at *23–25.
33
MONT. CODE ANN. § 20–25–515 (2015).
25
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District Court did not issue a subpoena in this matter and contends that “it
would have been inappropriate for the [District Court] to do so.34
3.
The Privacy Rights of the Students Named in the Records
Outweigh the Public’s Right to Know in This Case.
The Commissioner claims that Montana’s constitutional right to
know, provided in Article II, Section 9, must be balanced with the
constitutional right of privacy, enshrined in Article II, Section 10, and that
the privacy rights of the students involved in the records outweigh the right
to know in this case.35 The Commissioner asserts that a two-part test is
appropriate when a court balances these interests: first, the court must
determine “whether the individual has a subjective or actual expectation
of privacy,” and second determine “whether society is willing to recognize
that expectation as reasonable.”36 The Commissioner argues that the
existence of both federal and state law protecting student records
establishes that Montana students “have an actual expectation of privacy
in their records” and the “reasonableness of that expectation.”37 Further,
the Commissioner points out that other students, aside from the disciplined
student, who have personal information contained in the report also have
an expectation of privacy.38
The Commissioner also asserts that the publicity of Johnson’s
criminal trial is not relevant when considering his expectation of privacy
under either federal or state law.39 Moreover, the Commissioner also
contends that the entire incident, other than the Commissioner’s records,
is not a matter of public record because it is speculative to conclude that
the records unsealed by Judge Christensen involved Johnson.40 This is
because, as the Commissioner emphasizes, the unsealed records were
redacted to protect the identity of the “unknown and unnamed students
involved.”41 Lastly, the Commissioner points out that “a practice of
releasing [student] disciplinary records” is potentially damaging to both
the accused and the accuser because university disciplinary proceedings
“do not provide students with the same procedural due process protections
that criminal and civil defendants are afforded.”42
34

Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 12, at *23–24.
Id. at *25–26.
36
Id. at *25 (citing Bozeman Daily Chronicle v. City of Bozeman Police Dep’t, 859 P.2d 435, 439
(Mont. 1993).
37
Id.
38
Id. at *26.
39
Id. at *27.
40
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 12, at *28.
41
Id. at *29; Appellant’s Reply Brief; Krakauer v. State of Montana, 2015 WL 9220797 at *6–8
(Mont. 2015) (No. DA 15-0502).
42
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 12, at *29–31.
35
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4.
Krakauer, a Non-Resident, Does Not Have Standing to Avail
Himself of Either the Right to Access Public Records or the Right to Know
in Montana.
The Commissioner contends that Krakauer, as a Colorado
Resident, does not have standing to avail himself of either the right to
know enumerated in Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution or
“the accompanying open records laws” because both are bestowed solely
upon Montana citizens.43 First, the Commissioner points out that the right
to access law, Montana Code Annotated § 2–6–102, provides access to
“every citizen” and that Krakauer does not meet the definition of “citizen”
as provided by Montana Code Annotated § 1–1–402.44 Lastly, the
Commissioner asserts that although Article II, Section 9 provides that
“[n]operson shall be deprived of the right to examine documents,” the goal
of the provision is to provide access solely to citizens of Montana.45 In
support of this assertion, the Commissioner proffers transcripts of the 1972
Montana Constitutional Convention in which the delegates discuss the
right to know while using the word “citizen.”46
5.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding Fees to
Krakauer.
The Commissioner’s last contention is that the District Court
abused its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees to Krakauer.47 In support
of this argument, the Commissioner cites to Montana case law stating that
a district court abuses its discretion “when it acts arbitrarily without
employment of conscientious judgment.”48 The Commissioner goes on to
claim that the District Court “failed to exercise conscientious judgment”
by relying on Krakauer’s version of the facts and the law when awarding
attorney’s fees to Krakauer.49

43
44
45
46
47
48
49

Id. at *32–36.
Id. at *33–34; MONT. CODE ANN. § 2–6–102.
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 12, at *34–36.
Id.
Id. at *37.
Id. (citing Billings High Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Billings Gazette, 149 P.3d 565, 573 (Mont. 2006).
Id. at *38–39.
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B. Appellee Jon Krakauer
1.
FERPA Does Not Prohibit the Disclosure of the Commissioner’s
Records.
First, Krakauer asserts that FERPA is “essentially spending
legislation” that does not “create individual rights.”50 Accordingly,
Krakauer argues FERPA merely sets conditions for the “receipt of federal
funds” without prohibiting anything and with entirely “speculative”
repercussions.51 Krakauer claims that a single incidence of disclosure
through court order does not constitute a pattern or practice under FERPA
because it is not a “systematic policy or practice.”52 Krakauer points out
that under Montana case law, any decision concerning the disclosure of
records is done on a “case-by-case basis” that prohibits a single incident
of disclosure from setting a precedent that could constitute a “pattern or
practice.”53 Further, this case-by-case analysis does not take into
consideration the “petitioner’s level, need, or validity of interest” in the
requested information as the Commissioner suggests and such a
consideration is “wholly misplaced” in light of the fact that Article II,
Section 9 does not make such a limitation.54
Second, Krakauer asserts the Court’s rationale in Pioneer Press is
still controlling because it is not based upon the specific language of
FERPA, but rather upon the balancing analysis between Montana’s
constitutional right to know and right of privacy.55 Even if FERPA were
amended before the Court’s decision in Pioneer Press, Krakauer argues
that the Court would have reached the same conclusion because FERPA’s
confidentiality provisions “do not factor into the constitutional balancing
test nor mitigate the government’s constitutional obligations.”56
Third, Krakauer points out that the Commissioner claims FERPA
preempts the application of Montana constitutional or statutory law but
that a proper analysis of federal preemption doctrine leads to the
opposite.57 Krakauer asserts that a state law may only be preempted by
express preemption, “occupy the field” preemption, or conflict
preemption, and that none are applicable in the present case.58 FERPA
does not contain an express preemption clause, but rather allows disclosure
50

Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at *21 (quoting Pioneer Press, 160 P.3d at 486).
Id. at *21–22.
52
Id. at *23 (emphasis in original).
53
Id. at *24.
54
Id. at *25.
55
Id. at *29–30 (citing Pioneer Press, 160 P.3d at 489).
56
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at *31 (quoting Pioneer Press, 160 P.3d at 489).
57
Id. at *32.
58
Id. at *33 (citing Fenno v. Mountain W. Bank, 192 P.3d 224, 227 (Mont. 2008); Favel v. Am.
Renovation and Constr. Co., 59 P.3d 412, 423 (Mont. 2002)).
51
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through a “valid state court order.”59 Nor does Congress “occupy the field”
of education or educational records.60 Lastly, Krakauer claims that for
conflict preemption to apply, a “federal-state conflict must be actual and
unavoidable, not merely possible.”61 Since FERPA does not punish
educational institutions for every single instance of “non-consensual
release of student records,” but rather only if there is a “policy or practice
of non-consensual disclosure,” and FERPA does not sanction isolated
instances that are allowable under Montana’s case-by-case analysis,
Krakauer maintains that no “actual and unavoidable conflict of law
exists.”62 Since it is possibly to comply with both FERPA and state law,
Krakauer directs the Court to next analyze whether the underlying policies
of the state and federal provisions are conflicting.63 Krakauer points out
that an interest in protecting individual privacy is at the heart of both the
state and federal provisions and, consequently, no conflict can exist
because the state provision cannot stand as an obstacle to the objectives of
Congress when they are shared by the state.64 Accordingly, Krakauer
asserts that Montana’s statutory and constitutional right to know
provisions are not preempted by FERPA.65
Lastly, Krakauer argues that FERPA does not protect the student
disciplinary records he is requesting. Krakauer initially claims this is
because FERPA allows a court to order disclosure of otherwise protected
student information and will cover the Commissioner for any complaint of
such an order being improper.66 Next, Krakauer asserts that FERPA
explicitly excepts the “final results” of a disciplinary proceeding against a
student “alleged to have committed a rape offense.”67 Quoting the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Miami University,68 Krakauer
further notes that if a university finds that a student violated the
university’s rules by committing a rape offense, “then the alleged
perpetrator’s privacy interests are trumped by the public’s right to know
about such violations.”69 Since Krakauer is seeking the Commissioner’s
decision concerning the University’s determination that Johnson
committed rape, and the Commissioner’s records are the final result of the

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69

Id.
Id. at *33–34 (citing Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 432 (2002)).
Id. at *34 (quoting Favel, 59 P.3d at 425).
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at *34.
Id. at *34–35 (citing Fenno, 192 P.3d at 230–31).
Id. at *36.
Id. at *37.
Id. at *37–38.
Id. at *38 (citing 20 U.S.C.A. § 1232g(6)(B)).
294 F.3d 797, 812–13 (6th Cir. 2002).
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at *39.
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disciplinary proceeding, Krakauer claims that the FERPA exception
allows disclosure of the records.70
2.
Montana Code Annotated § 20–25–515 Does Not Prevent
Disclosure.
Krakauer asserts that the District Court correctly found that the
disclosure order was “well within the subpoena process contemplated by”
Montana Code Annotated § 20–25–515.71 Additionally, Krakauer claims
that even if the Commissioner’s argument has merit, “a statutory
prohibition of disclosure cannot trump the public’s right to know under
Article II, Section 9.”72
3.
The Merits of Public Disclosure Outweigh the Demands of
Privacy in This Case.
Krakauer urges the Court to affirm the District Court’s conclusion
that “the demands of individual privacy in the disciplinary records do not
clearly exceed the merits of public disclosure.”73 Krakauer contends that
the Commissioner’s insistence upon balancing the right to know against
the right of privacy is not technically correct because Article II, Section 9
provides the framework for weighing these competing interests by
providing that the right to examine government documents shall not be
infringed “except in cases in which the demand of individual privacy
clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure.”74 Accordingly, Krakauer
claims that the right to know “trumps” any privacy concerns in
government documents unless clearly exceeded by the demands of
individual privacy.75 Further, Krakauer asserts that there is a
“constitutional presumption of openness” unless disclosure is clearly
outweighed by individual privacy interests.76
Applying the two-part test for determining the balance between
the right to know and the right of privacy, Krakauer asserts that the
individual privacy interests in this case do not clearly exceed the merits of
disclosure.77 Krakauer claims that the Commissioner inappropriately looks
at the privacy expectations of university students generally but should be
focusing on Johnson’s actual or subjective expectations.78 Focusing on
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Id. at *40.
Id. at *42.
Id. at *41–42.
Id. at *42.
Id. at *43 (quoting Mont. Const. art. II, § 9).
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at *43.
Id.
Id. at *48.
Id. at *44.
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Johnson’s expectations, Krakauer claims that Johnson had a discounted
expectation of privacy on account of his agreement to abide by the
“Student-Athlete Conduct Code.”79 This Code requires athletes to
acknowledge their heightened public visibility and the fact that “their
actions are scrutinized more closely by the press.”80 Krakauer asserts that
this acknowledgment also makes “any arguable expectation of privacy”
Johnson may have had concerning the University’s handling of his
disciplinary proceedings unreasonable.81 As further support for the
argument that Johnson did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy,
Krakauer points out that Johnson’s dispute with the University and his
entire criminal trial were all thoroughly publicized.82 Lastly, Krakauer
contends that “even if some level of reasonable privacy interests are
implicated,” the merits of public disclosure in this case “outweigh them.”83
This is because, Krakauer asserts, the public has an interest in “knowing
how a publicly-funded university deals with a star quarterback accused of
rape,” particularly when the Commissioner apparently reversed findings
that Johnson committed the crime.84 Krakauer emphasizes that because the
Commissioner holds a position of public trust, society has a right to know
his “decision and rationale” for rejecting the findings of the Dean of
Students, the University Court and the President.85 Regardless of whether
or not there are privacy interests to be protected in the Commissioner’s
records, Krakauer states that he is willing to accept redacted copies of the
documents.86
4.
Krakauer Has Standing to Enforce the Right to Know Provided in
the Montana Constitution.
Krakauer asserts that the District Court properly interpreted the
plain meaning of Article II, Section 9 to conclude that he had standing to
seek enforcement of the right to know.87 In Associated Press v. Board of
Public Education,88 the Court concluded that Article II, Section 9 “is
unique, clear and unequivocal” and, therefore, the Court is “precluded by
general principles of constitutional construction, from resorting to
extrinsic methods of interpretation.” Accordingly, Krakauer contends, the
District Court could not resort to extrinsic evidence such as that proffered
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id. at *44–45.
Id.
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at *45.
Id. at *45–46.
Id. at *46.
Id. at *47.
Id.
Id. at *48.
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at *49–50.
804 P.2d 376, 379 (Mont. 1991).
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by the Commissioner and was correct to conclude that the right to know
applies to “all ‘persons,’” not solely Montana citizens.89
5.
The District Court Properly Awarded Attorney’s Fees to
Krakauer.
Krakauer argues that the Commissioner has not met his burden in
establishing that the District Court abused its discretion in awarding
attorney’s fees by “acting arbitrarily, without employment of
conscientious judgment,” or by exceeding the “bounds of reason resulting
in substantial injustice.”90 Krakauer claims that the Commissioner’s
contention that the District Court’s decision is not legally supported is
“merely the same legal argument” already presented.91 Krakauer notes that
he will not be entitled to fees if the Court reverses on the merits but asserts
that the real issue “is whether the equities of the case justify the district
court’s exercise of discretion in awarding fees after it determined
disclosure was authorized.”92 Krakauer affirmatively asserts, “they do.”93
IV. ANALYSIS
The seminal issue in this case is whether FERPA preempts
Montana’s constitutional right to know. Krakauer analyzes federal
preemption doctrine and appears to have the stronger argument when
claiming that none of the three types of federal preemption apply. If the
Court sides with Krakauer on this issue, then it must perform a two-part
test to determine whether or not the right of privacy “clearly exceeds” the
right to know in the present case.94 The Court must first determine whether
the “person has a subjective or actual expectation of privacy. If so, the
Court must determine “whether society is willing to recognize that
expectation as reasonable.”95 Here again, Krakauer appears to have the
stronger argument. First, in this case, Johnson’s acknowledgment to
heighted visibility and public scrutiny, as well as his, and the University’s,
enjoyment of his publicity as the star quarterback certainly diminish his
expectation of privacy. Second, the required acknowledgment and the
extensive publicity of Johnson’s entire ordeal, including both the
University proceedings and the public criminal trial attest to society’s
unwillingness to recognize any subjective expectation Johnson may have

89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at *50 (quoting Mont. Const. art. II, § 9).
Id. at *51–52 (citing Bozeman Daily Chronicle, 859 P.2d at 439).
Id. at *52.
Id.
Id.
Billings Gazette v. City of Billings, 313 P.3d 129, 133–34 (Mont. 2013).
Id.; MONT. Const. art. II, § 9.
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had as reasonable. Further, even if Johnson had an expectation of privacy
in the Commissioner’s decision, society has an enormous interest in
knowing why the Commissioner, an individual in a position of public trust,
apparently reversed the findings of the Dean of Students, the University
Court and the President that the star quarterback committed rape. Society’s
interest, as asserted by Krakauer, in analyzing the Commissioner’s
decision and rationale is certainly not clearly exceeded by Johnson’s right
of privacy. Further, although redaction will not protect Johnson at this
point, it will protect all other individuals who may have a privacy interest
implicated by the release of the records because their personal information
is not a matter of public record. In short, the public has a right to know
whether or not the Commissioner is dealing with allegations of rape fairly
and without favoritism that overrides any privacy interests implicated by
the release of the Commissioner’s records.
If the Court determines that FERPA preempts and controls the
disclosure of the Commissioner’s records concerning Johnson’s
disciplinary proceeding, then the decision will hinge upon one of two
questions. First, whether or not a court order compelling disclosure will
establish a prohibited “policy or practice” of releasing education records.
In Montana, it seems clear that this would not be the case because
decisions regarding the disclosure of documents implicating privacy
interests are decided on a case-by-case basis and the reasonableness of an
expectation of privacy “may vary, even regarding the same information
and the same recipient of that information.”96 If a court order were deemed
to establish a policy or practice, the next question would become whether
or not FERPA’s amended definition of “personally identifiable
information” prohibits the release of the requested information solely
because Krakauer requested Johnson’s records by name. Seeing as the
amended definition of “personally identifiable information” is only
irrelevant to a Montana constitutional analysis, if the Court determines that
FERPA preempts Montana law, then the amended definition would
prohibit disclosure in this case.

96

Mont. Human Rights Div. v. City of Billings, 649 P.2d 1283, 1288 (Mont. 1982).

